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Individuals of virtually all social species attempt to influ-
ence and control others’ behavior, from threatening 
aggression to offering mating. But beginning with Homo 
sapiens sapiens some 200,000 years ago, human social 
groups—now, cultural groups—created a new form of 
social control in which the group as a whole communi-
cated collective expectations for individual behavior in 
the form of social norms. Some social norms regulate, for 
instance, food distribution or mating and thus reduce 
interpersonal conflict and foster cooperative group func-
tioning (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Chudek & Henrich, 
2011). But for other social norms, individuals are expected 
to conform merely to coordinate with other group mem-
bers or to display their commitment to the group (Hogg 
& Reid, 2006; Lewis, 1969; Parsons, 1951; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). These conventional 
norms range from conventional ways of talking, dressing, 
using artifacts, and preparing food to cultural and reli-
gious rituals (Rossano, 2012; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; 
Turiel, 1983).
Young children are born into a world structured by 
social norms. For the first 3 years, however, they seem to 
perceive only the expectations that specific other indi-
viduals (e.g., their parents) have for their behavior. But 
from around age 3, children begin to say and do things 
that indicate a richer understanding of social norms as 
generic prescriptions and proscriptions coming from 
something larger than an individual and applying 
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Abstract
Human social life depends heavily on social norms that prescribe and proscribe specific actions. Typically, young 
children learn social norms from adult instruction. In the work reported here, we showed that this is not the whole 
story: Three-year-old children are promiscuous normativists. In other words, they spontaneously inferred the presence 
of social norms even when an adult had done nothing to indicate such a norm in either language or behavior. And 
children of this age even went so far as to enforce these self-inferred norms when third parties “broke” them. These 
results suggest that children do not just passively acquire social norms from adult behavior and instruction; rather, 
they have a natural and proactive tendency to go from “is” to “ought.” That is, children go from observed actions 
to prescribed actions and do not perceive them simply as guidelines for their own behavior but rather as objective 
normative rules applying to everyone equally.
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universally to anyone engaging in a certain activity (Nagel, 
1986; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Schmidt & Tomasello, 
2012; Smetana & Braeges, 1990). In several recent stud-
ies, 3-year-olds were taught the rules of a game, and then 
when a puppet played the game a different way, they 
corrected him or even taught him the right way to 
play it (Rakoczy, Brosche, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2009; 
Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008; Schmidt, 
Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011, 2012). They often did this 
with so-called generic normative language (e.g., “That’s 
not how it’s done!”). At a very young age, children thus 
cross over from being targets to being enforcers, and they 
clearly recognize the generic, even objective, nature of 
the norms they are enforcing.
All previous studies of young children’s norm learning 
have exposed them to the norm in a context that sug-
gests the presence of a right way to act. Typically, an 
adult explicitly teaches children the norm using generic 
normative language (“This is how it’s done”) and a con-
ventional label (e.g., “This is daxing”; Rakoczy et al., 
2008), and the objects are artifacts clearly designed to be 
used in a normatively prescribed way (Casler, Terziyan, & 
Greene, 2009; Schmidt et al., 2011). By contrast, in the 
current two experiments, we explored whether children 
who see adults performing actions might overinterpret 
those actions as instantiated generic social norms, even 
without any teaching, language, or artifacts. Young chil-
dren have been shown to be promiscuous imitators who 
overimitate actions irrelevant to an instrumental goal 
(Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & 
Horner, 2007; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) and promiscu-
ous teleologists who overattribute purposeful design to 
natural kinds (Kelemen, 1999, 2004). In the experiments 
reported here, we investigated the possibility that they 
are also promiscuous normativists who overattribute 
objective social norms when there actually are none.
In two experiments, 3-year-old children saw an adult 
spontaneously perform a novel action with some materi-
als, and then they saw a puppet perform a different 
action, with the same materials, that had the same result. 
This gave the children the opportunity to spontaneously 
intervene and protest if they perceived the action as nor-
matively wrong (Rakoczy et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 
2011). The modeled action was arbitrary, without obvi-
ous purpose, and thus rather open to overinterpretation 
in terms of the way something is done (as in “This is how 
we do it!”; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; Searle, 1995). To 
investigate the key question, we manipulated both the 
manner of demonstration (between participants) and the 
type of materials (within participants) used in that 
demonstration. Prior research suggested that children 
readily learn generic and normative knowledge in both 
pedagogical and nonpedagogical contexts (Butler & 
Markman, 2012, 2014, 2016; Butler, Schmidt, Bürgel, & 
Tomasello, 2015; Butler & Tomasello, 2016; Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009, 2011; Schmidt et al., 2011; Vredenburgh, 
Kushnir, & Casasola, 2015); accordingly, children saw 
the identical action performed by an adult, either (a) 
pedagogically for their benefit or (b) intentionally or 
accidentally by a stranger in an incidental observation.
In Experiment 1, each child saw the adult spontane-
ously fishing objects out of her bag. The adult used a 
tool, either an artifact (e.g., a human-made object with a 
hook), from which the child could infer a conventional 
purpose, or a natural “tool” (e.g., a branch that happened 
to be usable as a hook) that suggested no conventional 
purpose. In Experiment 2, we went a step further, strip-
ping away all of the cues—both in the objects themselves 
and in the social-pragmatic context—that might suggest a 
norm. We did so by using purposeless junk objects that 
the adult spontaneously took out of a trash bag (not out 
of her own bag). The trash bag was filled with junk 
objects that were incidentally found on the child’s chair 
in the beginning of the experiment. We predicted that in 
both experiments, regardless of whether the objects had 
a conventional purpose, children would infer a social 
norm from a single intentional action and would thus 
protest more when the action was pedagogical or inten-
tional than when it was accidental.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Forty-eight 3-year-old children (mean age = 
37 months, 25 days, age range = 36–40 months; 24 girls, 
24 boys) participated in the study. This age was chosen 
because 3 is the youngest age at which children have been 
shown to regularly understand and use normative lan-
guage in response to potential norm violations (Rakoczy 
et al., 2008). Thus, this age is the clearest starting point for 
this investigation. The sample size in both experiments 
was specified a priori on the basis of previous research 
that used a similar design and procedure (Schmidt et al., 
2011). In each condition, half of the participants were 
female and half were male. The children came from mixed 
socioeconomic backgrounds from a mid-sized German 
city and were recruited and tested in urban daycare cen-
ters. Parents provided written informed consent. The study 
was approved by the ethics committee at the Max Planck 
Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Eight additional 
children were tested but were excluded from the final 
sample because the experimenters made an error (n = 4), 
the children were uncooperative (e.g., refusing to sit at the 
table during the experiment; n = 1), or the children failed 
to meet the inclusion criterion of correcting or helping the 
puppet in at least one instrumental task during the warm-
up session (n = 3; see Procedure).
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Design. After a warm-up session, the children received 
four trials of target tasks, the order of which was system-
atically varied. The type of tool presented (i.e., artifact 
tool or natural “tool”) alternated between trials; half of 
the children received the artifact first. The children were 
randomly and evenly assigned to one of three between-
participants conditions: pedagogical action, intentional 
action, or accidental action. In the pedagogical- action 
condition, the experimenter’s actions appeared to be 
intentional and occurred after an ostensive communica-
tion with the child. In the other two conditions, the child 
incidentally observed while an experimenter interacted 
with objects, and these actions appeared to be either 
intentional or accidental and inadvertent.
Materials. In the warm-up session, a ball, a hammer 
game, and a disk-and-peg game were used. There were 
four target tasks (pushing, pulling, sliding, and hitting), 
each with an artifactual object and either an artifact or a 
natural “tool” (i.e., only one tool was used per child; for 
an overview of the target tasks, see Table 1). In addition, 
a polar-bear hand puppet and a bag (to hold the materi-
als) were used.
Procedure. The overall structure of the procedure was 
similar to that used in prior research on young children’s 
norm learning (Schmidt et al., 2011). In the pedagogical-
action condition, there were two experimenters: a coordi-
nator-model and a puppeteer (see Fig. 1). The child, the 
coordinator-model, and the puppeteer sat at a table (Fig. 
1). The coordinator-model addressed the child ostensively 
(e.g., by making eye contact). Consequently, the social-
pragmatic context of the pedagogical-action condition 
differed from that of the two conditions involving inciden-
tal observation. There were three experimenters: the 
model, the puppeteer, and the coordinator (Fig. 1). In 
these incidental-observation conditions, however, the 
model was an unknown individual who was present in 
the experiment room at a separate table before the other 
parties entered the room. Upon entering, the coordinator 
addressed the model formally (“Oh, good morning! 
Excuse me, we actually wanted to play a bit here.”). The 
model was busy writing something down and answered, 
“Yes, okay. I am just working here.” In the intentional- and 
accidental-action conditions, the model was always busy 
writing something down except when performing actions 
during the introductory phase, as described later.
Table 1. Overview of the Four Target Tasks in Each Experiment
Description of tools and object
Target task Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Actions
Pushing Artifactual tool: Gray handle  
with flat end
Natural “tool”: Piece of wood 
with longish, flat end
Object: Multicolored object
—
Natural “tool”: Piece of wood 
with longish, flat end
Object: Damaged snail shell
Action 1: Take tool horizontally and 
push object forward with the longish, 
flat end of the tool.
Action 2: Take tool horizontally 
(longish, flat end to the left), put it on 
top of the object, and push it forward.
Pulling Artifactual tool: Black stick with 
metal hook




Natural “tool”: Branch with 
hooklike end
Object: Piece of bark
Action 1: Take tool horizontally and 
pull object toward self.
Action 2: Take tool vertically (hook at 
top), put it on top of the object, and 
pull it toward self.
Sliding Artifactual tool: Brown handle with 
rectangular prism at one end
Natural “tool”: Piece of bark
Object: Multicolored object with 
opening
Artifactual “tool”: Piece of 
crumpled-up cardboard
—
Object: Slightly torn and 
crumpled-up sandwich paper
Action 1: Take tool horizontally, put it 
into the opening of the object, and 
slide it forward diagonally.
Action 2: Take tool horizontally, put 
it on top of the object, and push it 
forward.
Hitting Artifactual tool: Flat triangular 
slider with a flat handle
Natural “tool”: Flat stone
Object: Multicolored object
Artifactual “tool”: Piece of 
tattered fabric
—
Object: Piece of crumpled paper
Action 1: Take tool vertically and hit 
object so it moves forward.
Action 2: Put object onto the tool 
(Experiment 1) and also wrap up 
piece of paper with piece of fabric 
(Experiment 2) and push the objects 
forward.
Note: Action 1 was performed by the coordinator-model or model. Action 2 was performed by the puppet.
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In the warm-up session for all conditions, the child, 
the coordinator or coordinator-model, and the puppet 
first played with a ball. Then the children received two 
instrumental tasks in fixed order: a hammer task, in 
which a hammer was used to send balls through holes in 
a cube-shaped wooden object, and a disk-and-peg task, 
in which disks were put on pegs. The coordinator or 
coordinator-model first modeled an instrumental action 
(e.g., putting a disk onto a peg) without using any lan-
guage. Then, the child could play, followed by the pup-
pet, which made an instrumental mistake (e.g., putting a 
disk vertically onto a peg, so it did not fit), so the chil-
dren had the opportunity to correct and help the puppet. 
This intervention could be implicit, such as pointing ges-
tures, or explicit, such as protest and action directives 
(e.g., “Wrong! The other way round!”). More details on 
the warm-up session are available at https://osf.io/fe9u2. 
This was done to familiarize and make the children feel 
comfortable with the puppet and to make clear that it 
was fine to intervene and interact with the puppet. Thus, 
the inclusion criterion of correcting or helping the pup-
pet in at least one instrumental task was chosen to ensure 
that children felt comfortable and were not afraid of 
interacting with the puppet. Note that if this warm-up 
session merely primed the children to correct an incom-
petent puppet, they should intervene equally across con-
ditions in the later target tasks.
The children then participated in four target tasks. 
Each target task consisted of an introductory phase and a 
test phase (for an overview, see Fig. 2; for more details, 
see https://osf.io/fe9u2). In the introductory phase, the 
coordinator-model (pedagogical-action condition) or the 
model (incidental-observation conditions) performed a 
simple action (Action 1; see Table 1) in the absence of 
the puppet (the children had witnessed the puppet going 
to sleep). Then, the coordinator-model or the coordinator 
gave the objects to the child, commenting neutrally, “Now 
you can have that.” This gave the children the opportu-
nity to act on the objects themselves. In the test phase, 
the puppet returned and performed an alternative action 
(Action 2), the result of which was equal or very similar 
to that of Action 1 but accomplished by different means 
(see Table 1). After the puppet’s action, the coordinator-
model or coordinator put away the objects, saying, “I’ll 
put this away.”
In the conditions involving incidental observation, the 
model sat at a separate table and performed the action 
on her own. Thus, the children’s attention to the model’s 
action was drawn by bottom-up, nonpedagogical cues 
(the model made noise when putting writing material on 
the table, when fetching objects out of the bag, and by 
laughing about the objects; the coordinator appeared 
busy—writing something down—before looking curi-
ously toward the model when the model started making 
noise; see Figs. 1 and 2). After the model performed the 
action and went on working, the coordinator collected 
the objects from the model’s table, came back to the main 
table, looked at the objects briefly, and then gave the 
objects to the child.
In one target task (pushing; see Table 1), for instance, 
the model used a tool (a piece of wood with a longish, 
flat end or a gray handle with a flat end) horizontally to 
push a multicolored object forward. The puppet’s alter-
native action (Action 2) was to put the tool on top of the 
multicolored object (horizontally, longish end to the left) 
and push it forward.
Pedagogical-Action Condition
(Ostensive Communication)

















Fig. 1. Setup for Experiments 1 and 2: introductory phases of (left) the pedagogical-action condition and (right) the intentional- and accidental-
action conditions (for details, see Table 1 and Fig. 2). In all conditions, the children witnessed the puppet going to sleep before the introductory 
phase. In the pedagogical-action condition, a coordinator-model performed Action 1 in front of the child. In the intentional- and accidental-action 
conditions, a model performed Action 1 right next to the child, looking down and away from the child, while the coordinator looked on; the dis-
tance between the two tables (i.e., from the corner closest to the model’s left arm to the corner between the child and puppet) was approximately 
45 cm. The objects and “tools” shown are from Experiment 2.








uses ostensive cues 
(e.g., eye contact) 
toward child.
Model is not known to child, puppeteer, or 
coordinator and does not use ostensive cues.
The coordinator-model or model curiously rummages around in her bag 
(Experiment 1) or in a trash bag (Experiment 2), says “Hmm,” and fishes out 
the object and then the “tool.” While retrieving each item, she laughs in 
surprise and amusement (“Ha ha!”) and explores it briefly. 
Coordinator-model 
looks at child 
(“Look!”) and 
performs Action 1 
intentionally, as if 















Model continues to appear busy and working.
Child is prompted by coordinator-model or coordinator to act on the objects:
“Now, you can have that.”
Puppet returns (“Well”) and asks, “Oh, can I have that now?” Coordinator-
model or coordinator gives objects to puppet (“Yes, now Max can have 
that”) and turns away from the table to write something down. Puppet 







Fig. 2. Structure of the introductory and testing phases in Experiments 1 and 2. In all conditions, the children had 
witnessed the puppet going to sleep before the introductory phase began. Action 1 and its outcome for each task were 
the same in all conditions. Action 2 was performed by the puppet, and its result was equal or very similar to that of 
Action 1 but accomplished by different means.
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Coding and reliability. All sessions were recorded, 
transcribed, and coded from videotape by a single observer. 
A second independent observer, blind to the hypotheses 
and conditions of the study, transcribed and coded a ran-
dom sample of 25% of all sessions for reliability.
The children’s spontaneous verbal and behavioral inter-
ventions in the test phase of each target task were coded 
as protest if they were indicative of the child either directly 
or indirectly referring to the model’s Action 1 as the stan-
dard. Thus, there were four subcategories of protest:
•• Normative protest, which included verbal or behav-
ioral protest, correction, and critique that made use 
of normative or generic vocabulary (i.e., deontic 
terms, such as “right,” “wrong,” “must,” “should”; e.g., 
“You should not do it this way!”), thus also including 
normative teaching (e.g., the child demonstrated 
Action 1 and said, “This is how it is done!”).
•• Imperative protest, which included verbal or 
behavioral protest without normative vocabulary 
but with imperative phrases or action directives 
(e.g., “Push it with this one!” or “Not like this!”) or 
polite forms using “can” (e.g., “You can slide it like 
this!”) that were related to the puppet’s actions 
with the materials.
•• Nonnormative teaching, in which the child demon-
strated Action 1 and communicated with the pup-
pet nonverbally (via eye contact) or verbally (e.g., 
“Like this!” or “I’m going to show you”).
•• Tattling, which consisted of telling the coordinator 
or coordinator-model, using the third-person form, 
that the puppet performed an action different from 
Action 1 (e.g., “He does it differently!”).
Further behaviors or utterances not explicit or specific 
enough to be considered protest (with reference to 
Action 1) included the following:
•• Descriptive interventions—for example, informing 
(e.g., “Look what [the puppet] has”), nonspecific 
statements (e.g., “No!”), asking about the objects or 
asking the puppet what he or she was doing, 
pointing to objects, or acting on the objects with-
out communicating with the puppet.
•• Ambiguous interventions—action directives that 
were not related to Action 1 or were nonspecific 
(e.g., “Knock on it!” although knocking was not 
modeled during Action 1, or “Take it!” without fur-
ther qualification of the object the child was refer-
ring to).
•• Irrelevant behaviors—all other behaviors (e.g., the 
child said “That’s [the puppet]”).
Interrater reliability was very good, Cohen’s κ = .89. 
For each trial on each target task, protest was coded as 0 
if the children exhibited no protest or as 1 if the children 
exhibited at least one of the four subcategories of protest. 
Each child thus received a binary protest score per trial 
and a summed protest score (0–4) over the four trials 
(collapsed across type of tool). Summed scores were 
computed on the basis of four trials (except for one trial 
that we excluded because the child did not pay attention 
to Action 1 during the introductory phase).
Statistical analysis. Statistical analyses were run in R 
(Version 3.0.2; R Development Core Team, 2013). Because 
the summed score and the binary score violated the 
assumptions of standard linear models (i.e., normally dis-
tributed errors), we used a generalized linear model (GLM) 
with negative binomial error distribution for the summed 
score (0–4) and a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) 
with binomial error distribution for the binary score to 
account for the nonindependence in the binary data (i.e., 
repeated measurements per child; Baayen, 2008). Informa-
tion-criterion statistics (Akaike information criterion) were 
used to determine the best-fitting and most parsimonious 
GLM (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).
For the GLMM on the binary score, the initial full 
model included condition, type of tool, and their interac-
tion as predictor variables, the control variables trial 
(z-transformed) and gender as fixed effects, and random 
intercepts for participants’ identity. Effects of interest 
were tested by comparing the fit of the full model with 
the fit of the respective reduced model (without the pre-
dictor to be tested) using a likelihood ratio test (Dobson, 
2002). If the interaction of condition and type of tool was 
not significant, the interaction term was dropped from 
the full model. There were no effects of gender or trial, 
but these variables were kept in the GLMM to control for 
confounding effects. On the basis of the unstandardized 
parameter estimates (b) and standard errors of a GLM on 
the summed score with the predictor condition, a planned 
linear contrast was performed if the prior GLMM indi-
cated no significant interaction of condition and type of 
tool. The GLM included an offset term (log-transformed 
total valid number of trials) to adjust for the number of 
opportunities that children had to perform protest (i.e., 
the response variable was treated as a rate). The measure 
of association was the value of r for the linear contrast 
(rcontrast; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 2003), and 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs) were computed for parameter estimates.
Results
The children’s protest for the two types of tools (artifac-
tual tools and natural “tools”) showed the same pattern 
across conditions (see Fig. 3), as indicated by a nonsig-
nificant interaction of type of tool and condition in a 
GLMM using the binary protest score, χ2(2) = 0.20, p = .90 
(likelihood ratio test). Across conditions, the children 
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protested significantly more for artifactual tools than for 
natural “tools,” χ2(1) = 4.50, p = .034; b = −1.02, SE = 0.48, 
95% CI = [−2.06, −0.08]. Thus, our main analysis focused 
on the summed protest score (0–4; collapsed across type 
of tool). Our prediction was that the children would pro-
test equally in the pedagogical-action and intentional-
action conditions, and that they would protest more in 
these two conditions than in the accidental-action condi-
tion. The corresponding linear contrast (pedagogical 
action: 1; intentional action: 1; accidental action: −2) was 
significant, with a medium effect size, F(1, 45) = 5.67, 
p = .022, rcontrast = .33: The children’s protest did not differ 
between the pedagogical-action condition (M = 1.56, SD = 
1.55) and the intentional-action condition (M = 1.13, 
SD = 1.45), b = −0.33, SE = 0.46, z = −0.72, p = .472, 95% 
CI = [−1.23, 0.56], but the children protested significantly 
more often in these conditions than they did in the acciden-
tal-action condition (M = 0.38, SD = 0.81; see also Fig. 3).
Discussion
These results suggest that children are capable of block-
ing a normative inference from a nonintentional action 
and, more importantly, that they seem to view any inten-
tional action as at least somewhat normative and gener-
alizable, even if carried out using a natural object without 
any conventional purpose.
In this experiment, however, the objects came out of 
the adult’s own bag, which potentially suggested that she 
spontaneously selected her objects to serve a conven-
tional purpose. In Experiment 2, therefore, we introduced 
two minor, but critical, changes. First, instead of using 
artifacts or even carefully selected natural objects, an 
adult performed novel actions with purposeless junk 
objects (natural junk or artifact junk). Second, the adult 
spontaneously took the objects out of a trash bag, which 
was filled with junk objects that had incidentally been 
found on the child’s chair before. The adult then looked 
at them quizzically, laughed, and then went ahead and 
performed the idiosyncratic action. Thus, both the objects 
themselves and the social-pragmatic context precluded 
any potential normative interpretation that these actions 
represented the right way to act. This singular unplanned 
action was performed, as in Experiment 1, pedagogically, 
intentionally, or accidentally. Crucially, however, the con-
text suggested that even in the pedagogical demonstra-
tion, the adult was showing the child only what one 
could spontaneously do with these novel objects on the 
spot rather than knowing how these kinds of things were 
meant to be used.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Forty-eight 3-year-old children (M = 38 
months, 9 days, range = 36–40 months; 24 girls, 24 boys) 
participated in the study and were recruited and tested as 
in Experiment 1. Seven additional children were tested 
but were excluded from the final sample because of 
experimenter error (n = 4) or because the children failed 
to meet the inclusion criterion of correcting or helping 
the puppet in at least one instrumental task during the 
warm-up session (n = 3).
Design. The number and order of the tasks (warm-up 
session, target tasks) were identical to those in Experiment 
1. Thus, the children received four trials of target tasks, and 
type of junk (artifactual, natural) was systematically varied. 



























Fig. 3. Mean sum score of protest for each type of tool (artifactual or natural) in each condi-
tion of Experiment 1. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.
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of three between-participants conditions: pedagogical 
action, intentional action, or accidental action.
Materials. In the four target tasks, artifact junk (sliding 
and hitting tasks), including artifactual “tools” and objects, 
and natural junk (pushing and pulling tasks), including 
natural “tools” and objects, were used (for an overview of 
the target tasks, see Table 1). Moreover, a trash bag and 
further junk objects were used.
Procedure. The overall procedure was very similar to 
that in Experiment 1, except for the following changes. 
First, as in Experiment 1, the coordinator, the child, and 
the puppeteer entered the room, and the coordinator 
addressed the model formally (incidental-observation 
conditions) or the coordinator-model, the child, and the 
puppeteer entered the room (pedagogical-action condi-
tion). Then the coordinator (incidental-observation condi-
tions) or the coordinator-model (pedagogical-action 
condition) found junk (including the test objects and fur-
ther junk objects) on the child’s chair (“Huh, what kind of 
stuff is that?!”). She looked around, incidentally found a 
trash bag, and put the objects into the bag (“I’ll throw this 
in this trash bag here”). Thus, in contrast to Experiment 1, 
the social-pragmatic context was devoid of any cues that 
might indicate that the objects belonged to the model or 
coordinator-model (or to anyone else) or served any par-
ticular purpose for playing a game or the like. Second, 
after the warm-up session, the coordinator or coordinator-
model said, “All right, done! I don’t have anything else 
with me!” to indicate that she did not plan to show the 
child more objects. Then, in the pedagogical-action con-
dition, the coordinator-model looked around in the room, 
took the trash bag, curiously looked into it, and fetched 
objects out of it as in Experiment 1. In the conditions 
involving incidental observation, the model started fetch-
ing objects out of the trash bag (as in Experiment 1) after 
the coordinator’s announcement that she had nothing 
more. Table 1 provides an overview of the target tasks.
Coding and reliability. Coding and reliability were 
the same as in Experiment 1. Interrater reliability was 
very good, Cohen’s κ = .83. Summed scores were com-
puted on the basis of four trials (except for 1 child for 
whom the last trial was excluded because the child 
wanted to leave).
Statistical analysis. Statistical analyses were run as in 
Experiment 1.
Results
The children’s protest for the two types of junk (artifactual 
and natural) showed the same pattern across conditions 
(see Fig. 4), as indicated by a nonsignificant interaction of 
type of junk and condition in the GLMM using the binary 
protest score, χ2(2) = 0.92, p = .63. The children’s binary 
protest scores for artifact junk and natural junk did not dif-
fer, χ2(1) = 2.42, p = .12; b = −0.74, SE = 0.48, 95% CI = 
[−1.73, 0.19]. Thus, our main analysis focused on the 
summed protest score (0–4, collapsed across type of junk). 
Our predictions were that children would protest equally in 
the pedagogical-action and intentional-action conditions 
and that they would protest more in these two conditions 
than in the accidental-action condition. The corresponding 
linear contrast (pedagogical action: 1; intentional action: 1; 
accidental action: −2) was significant, with a medium effect 
size, F(1, 45) = 5.41, p = .025, rcontrast = .33: The children’s 
protest did not differ between the pedagogical-action con-
dition (M = 0.94, SD = 1.12) and the intentional-action con-
dition (M = 0.81, SD = 1.17), b = −0.14, SE = 0.47, z = −0.30, 
p = .76, 95% CI = [−1.08, 0.78], and protest was significantly 
higher in these conditions than in the accidental-action 



























Fig. 4. Mean sum score of protest for each type of junk (artifact or natural) in each condition 
of Experiment 2. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.
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Discussion
We found that the children still corrected the puppet rea-
sonably often in both the pedagogical-action and inten-
tional-action conditions but not in the accidental-action 
condition, even though there was absolutely nothing in 
the social-pragmatic context, the objects, or the adult’s 
language to suggest a general norm. Hence, the children 
truly seemed to be imposing a norm in the absence of 
any relevant cues, which suggests a natural tendency to 
overattribute normativity to intentional actions.
General Discussion
It is a truism in modern thinking (known as Hume’s Law; 
Hume, 1739/2000) that one cannot make an inferential 
leap from how the world is to how the world ought to 
be. But that is precisely what the children in this study 
seemed to be doing. They incidentally observed how a 
particular person performed a spontaneous, unplanned 
action, with no normative trappings, no pattern of regu-
larity, and no obvious purpose, but made the inferential 
leap that this is how one generally ought to do it. They 
were thus leaping inferentially from observing a sponta-
neous human action to understanding it as objectively 
binding, applying it to anyone who might perform the 
action. In Experiment 2, in particular, we exposed the 
children to a novel action in a context in which we elimi-
nated any suggestion that the action had anything to do 
with cultural, prescribed, or generic ways of acting. Still, 
in the two conditions that had any intentional actions at 
all, many of the children assumed that a subsequent 
novel actor was subject to a general norm. Given the way 
the experiment was designed, this was a social norm that 
could only have come from the children themselves, 
illustrating their promiscuous normativity.
The children in this study committed the is-ought fal-
lacy when observing simple, arbitrary, intentional acts 
that did not serve any obvious instrumental purpose. 
Thus, these actions were ends in themselves—albeit evi-
dently individual and nongeneralizable—and at least 
open to overinterpretation regarding their conventional-
ity and normativity if the children inferred that the mod-
els signaled the general way something is done (Schmidt 
et al., 2011). Clearly, it cannot be the case that children in 
general promiscuously attribute normativity to all the 
intentional actions they observe. However, if—as in our 
study—the action itself seems to be the goal of the activ-
ity and the action is performed on some objects in an 
intentional yet arbitrary way, children seem to be prone 
to overinterpret these singular, spontaneous actions as 
representing generic social norms. Psychologically, pro-
miscuous normativity may derive from children’s early 
motivation to entertain collective intentional states, to 
identify with their cultural groups, and to construct and 
reify social concepts (Gabennesch, 1990; Schmidt & 
Tomasello, 2012; Turiel, 1983). Functionally, promiscuous 
normativity may be an important mechanism in explain-
ing human cultural evolution, institutionalization, and 
maintenance of social order, but also innovation (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2009; Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Legare & 
Nielsen, 2015; Tomasello, 2014). Overall, the children’s 
protest rates were rather low; it might be the case that 
some of the children were too shy to intervene (Rakoczy 
et al., 2008). Nonetheless, these rates are comparable 
with findings from other studies using similar methods 
and, in some cases, even with findings from studies that 
included clear verbal cues introducing the act as norma-
tive (Butler et al., 2015; Schmidt, Rakoczy, Mietzsch, & 
Tomasello, 2016).
The current findings open new avenues for the study 
of the development of children’s social cognition. Over 
the past few decades, developmental psychologists have 
gained insight into the development of children’s theory 
of mind, broadly construed as understanding how other 
people’s mental states reflect and represent reality and 
guide action (Wellman, 2011). But our results suggest that 
from very early in development, normativity may be fun-
damentally intertwined with children’s understanding of 
other people’s actions and intentionality. Further research 
is needed to investigate the (reciprocal) relations between 
theory of mind and normativity and to chart their inter-
play over the course of early development. Furthermore, 
it is vital to assess the developmental trajectory of pro-
miscuous normativity and to examine what factors (e.g., 
the model’s age or prior reliability) might modulate chil-
dren’s tendency to make normative inferences in con-
texts devoid of clear cues of normativity.
In summary, preschoolers regularly make generic and 
objective inferences when explicitly taught some action or 
when reasoning about existing regularities (Bonawitz 
et al., 2011; Butler & Markman, 2012; Cimpian & Salomon, 
2014; Rakoczy et al., 2008); some theorists have pro-
posed that this reflects a specific human adaptation for 
natural pedagogy dealing with kind-relevant information 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2009, 2011). Our results suggest that 
the phenomenon may be much broader than this; it may 
apply to cultural knowledge transmitted, obtained, and 
even constructed in all kinds of ways. Thus, young chil-
dren are not only quick to acquire social norms from 
observing the actions of other people but also quick, 
perhaps even overly quick, to construct a social norm out 
of whole cloth, even when it does not exist in either the 
mind of the actor or the culture at large.
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